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Abstract— Mobile IPv6 will be an integral part of the next 
generation Internet protocol. The importance of mobility in the 
Internet gets keep on increasing. Current specification of Mobile 
IPv6 does not provide proper support for reliability in the mobile 
network and there are other problems associated with it. In this 
paper, we propose “Virtual Private Network (VPN) based Home 
Agent Reliability Protocol (VHAHA)” as a complete system 
architecture and extension to Mobile IPv6 that supports 
reliability and offers solutions to the security problems that are 
found in Mobile IP registration part. The key features of this 
protocol over other protocols are: better survivability, 
transparent failure detection and recovery, reduced complexity 
of the system and workload, secure data transfer and improved 
overall performance. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As mobile computing has become a reality, new 
technologies and protocols have been developed to provide 
mobile users the services that already exist for non-mobile 
users. Mobile Internet Protocol (Mobile IP) [1, 2] is one of 
those technologies that enables a node to change its point of 
attachment to the Internet in a manner that is transparent to the 
application on top of the protocol stack. Mobile IP based 
system extends an IP based mobility of nodes by providing 
Mobile Nodes (MNs) with continuous network connections 
while changing their locations. In other words, it transparently 
provides mobility for nodes while backward compatible with 
current IP routing schemes by using two types of Mobility 
Agents (MA), the Home Agent (HA) and the Foreign Agent 
(FA).  
While HA is responsible for providing permanent location 
to each mobile user, the FA is responsible for providing Care-
Of-Address (COA) to each mobile user who visits the Foreign 
Network. Each HA maintains a Home Location Register 
(HLR), which contains the MN’s Home Address, current 
COA, secrets and other related information. Similarly, FA 
maintains Visitors Location Register (VLR) which maintains 
information about the MNs for which the FA provides 
services. When the MN is within the coverage area of HA, it 
gets the service from the HA. If the MN roams away from the 
coverage of HA, it has to register with any one of the FAs 
around to obtain the COA. This process is known as 
“Registration” and the association between MN and FA is 
known as “Mobility Binding”.  
In the Mobile IP scenario described above, the HAs are the 
single point of failure. Because all the communication to the 
MN is through the HA, since the Correspondent Node (CN) 
knows only the Home Address. Hence, when a particular HA 
is failed, all the MNs getting service from the faulty HA will 
be affected. According to the current specification of Mobile 
IP when a MN detects that it’s HA is failed, it has to search for 
some other HA and recreate the bindings and other details. 
This lacks the transparency, since everything is done by the 
MN. Also, this is a time consuming process which leads to the 
service interruption. Another important issue is the security 
problem in Mobile IP registration.  Since the MN is allowed to 
change its point of attachment, it is highly mandatory to 
ensure and authenticate the current point of attachment. As a 
form of remote redirection that involves all the mobility 
entities, the registration part is very crucial and must be 
guarded against any malicious attacks that might try to take 
illegitimate advantages from any participating principals.  
Hence, the major requirements of Mobile IPv6 
environment are providing fault-tolerant services and 
communication security. Apart from the above said basic 
requirements, the Mobile IP framework should have the 
following characteristics: 1) The current communication 
architecture must not be changed. 2) The mobile node 
hardware should be simple and does not require complicated 
calculations. 3) The system must not increase the number of 
times that communication data must be exchanged. 4) All 
communication entities are to be highly authenticated 5) 
Communication confidentiality and location privacy are to be 
ensured and 6) Communication data must be protected from 
active and passive attacks.  
Based on the above said requirements and goals, this paper 
proposes “A secure and fault-tolerant framework for Mobile 
IPv6 based networks” as a complete system architecture and 
an extension to Mobile IPv6 that supports reliability and offers 
solutions to the registration security problems. The key 
features of the proposed approach over other approaches are: 
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better survivability, transparent failure detection and recovery, 
reduced complexity of the system and workload, secure data 
transfer and improved overall performance. Despite its 
practicality, the proposed framework provides a scalable 
solution for authentication, while sets minimal computational 
overhead on the Mobile Node and the Mobility agents. 
II. EARLIER RESEARCH AND STUDIES 
Several solutions have been proposed for the reliability 
problem. The proposals that are found in [3-8] are for Mobile 
IPv4 and [9-15] are for Mobile IPv6 based networks. The 
architecture and functionality of Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 
are entirely different. Hence, any solutions that are applicable 
for Mobile IPv4 can not be applicable for Mobile IPv6 for the 
reason cited here: In mobile IPv4, the single HA at the Home 
Link serves the MN which makes the Mobile IPv4 prone to 
single point of failure problems.  To overcome this problem, 
the Mobile IPv4 solutions propose HA redundancy. But in 
Mobile IPv6, instead of having single HA, the entire Home 
Link would serve the MNs. The methods proposed in [9, 10, 
11, 12] are providing solutions for Mobile IPv6 based 
networks.   
In Inter Home Agent Redundancy Protocol (HAHA) [9], 
one primary HA will provide service to the MNs and Multiple 
HAs from different Home Links are configured as Secondary 
HAs. When the primary HA failed, the secondary HA will be 
acting as Primary HA. But, the registration delay is high and 
the approach is not transparent to MNs. The Home Agent 
Redundancy Protocol (HARP) proposed in [10] is similar to 
[9], but here all redundant HAs are considered from the same 
domain. The advantages of this approach are registration delay 
and computational overhead are less when compared to the 
other methods. But, the drawback of this approach is that the 
Home link is the single point of failure.  
The Virtual Home Agent Redundancy Protocol (VHARP) 
[11, 12, 13] is similar to [10], but it deals with load balancing 
issues also. In [14], the reliability is provided by using two 
HAs in the same Home link. The primary and the secondary 
HAs are synchronized by using transport layer connections. 
This approach provides transparency and load balancing.  
Also, registration delay and service interruptions are less. But, 
if the Home Link or both HAs are failed, then the entire 
network will be collapsed.  
Moreover, none of the above said approaches deals with 
the registration security even if it plays a crucial role. 
Registration in mobile IP must be made secure so that 
fraudulent registration can be detected and rejected. 
Otherwise, any malicious user in the internet could disrupt 
communications between the home agent and the mobile node 
by the simple expedient of supplying a registration request 
containing a bogus care-of-address. The secret key based 
authentication in Base Mobile IP is not scalable. Besides, it 
also can’t provide non-repudiation that seems likely to be 
demanded by various parties, especially in commercial 
settings. 
Many proposals are available to overcome the above said 
problems which can be broadly classified under the following 
categories: (i) Certificate Authority – Public key Infrastructure 
(CA-PKI) based protocol [15] (ii) Minimal public key based 
protocol [16] (iii) Hybrid technique of Secret and CA-PKI 
based protocol [17] and (iv) Self-certified public key based 
protocols [18]. 
(i) CA-PKI based mechanisms define a new Certificate 
Extension message format with the intention to carry 
information about Certificates, which now must always be 
appended in all the control messages. Due to high 
computational complexity, this approach is not suitable for 
wireless environment.  
(ii) The Minimal Public key based method aims to provide 
public key based authentication and a scalable solution for 
authentication while setting only minimal computing on the 
mobile host. Even if this approach uses only the minimal 
public key based framework to prevent the replay attack, the 
framework must be executed by using complex computations 
due to the creation of digital signatures at the MN. This 
increases the computational complexity at the MN. 
(iii) Hybrid technique of Secret and CA-PKI based 
protocol proposes the secure key combine minimal public key 
besides producing the communication session key in mobile 
node registration protocol. The drawback of this approach is 
found to be the registration delay. When compared to other 
protocols, this approach is considerably increasing the delay in 
registration. In addition to that, the solution to the location 
anonymity is only partial. 
(iv) Providing strong security at the same time reducing the 
Registration delay and Computational complexity is an 
important issue in Mobile IP. Hence, for the first time self-
certified public keys are used in [18, 19] which considerably 
reduce the time complexity of the system. But, this proposal 
does not address the authentication issues of CN, Binding 
Update (BU) messages which lead to Denial-Of-Service attack 
and impersonation problems. 
Based on the above discussions, it is observed that a secure 
and fault-tolerant framework is mandatory which will tolerate 
inter home link failures and ensure secure registration that 
should not increase registration overhead and computational 
complexity of the system.  
III.  PROPOSED APPROACH 
This paper proposes a fault-tolerant framework and 
registration protocol for Mobile IPv6 based networks to 
provide reliability and security. The solution is based on 
interlink HA redundancy and self certified keys. The proposal 
is divided into two major parts:  (i) Virtual Home Agent 
Redundancy (VHAHA) architecture design and (ii) VHAHA 
Registration protocol.  
The first part proposes the design of fault-tolerant 
framework while the second part ensures the secure 
registration with the Mobility Agents. This proposed approach 
provides reliability and security by introducing extension to 
overall functionality and operation of current Mobile IPv6. 
The advantages of this approach are:  reliable Mobile IPv6 
operations, better survivability, transparent failure detection 
and recovery, reduced complexity of the system and workload,
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Figure 1. VHAHA Architecture 
 
secure data transfer and improved overall performance. The 
results are also verified by performing simulation. The 
simulation results show that with minimal registration delay 
and computational overhead the proposed approach achieves 
the desired outcome. 
IV. FRAMEWORK OF VHAHA 
The design of VHAHA framework is divided into three 
major modules: (i) Architecture design (ii) VHAHA Scenario 
and data transmission and (iii) Failure detection and recovery 
algorithm.  
A. Architecture design 
The architecture of the proposed protocol is given in Fig. 1. 
As part of Mobile IPv6, multiple Home Links are available in 
the network and each Home Link consists of multiple HAs. In 
this approach, one HA is configured as Active HA, some of the 
HAs are configured as Backup HAs and few other HAs are 
configured as Inactive HAs from the Home Link. The Active 
HA provides all Mobile IPv6 services, the Inactive HA 
provides minimal set of services and Backup HA provides mid 
range of services. VHAHA requires that for each MN there 
should be at least two HAs (one active HA and the other could 
be any one of the backup HA) holding its binding at any 
instance of time. The functionalities of these HAs are given 
below: 
Active HA: There must be a HA on the Home Link serving 
as the Active HA. Only one HA could act as Active HA at any 
instance of time. The active HA maintains the Binding cache, 
which stores the mobility bindings of all MNs that are 
registered under it. This will hold [0-N] mobility bindings. 
This is responsible for data delivery and exclusive services. 
The exclusive services mainly include Home Registration, De-
registration, Registration, Registration-refresh, IKE and 
DHAD. Besides these, it provides regular HA services such as 
Tunneling, reverse Tunneling, Return Routability and IPv6 
neighbor discovery.  
Backup HA: For each MN, there will be at least two HAs 
which will be acting as backup HAs (no limits on maximum 
no. of HAs). The purpose of Backup HA is to provide 
continuous HA services in case of HA failures or overloading. 
The back up HA could hold [1-N] bindings in its binding 
cache. This provides all the services of Active HA except the 
exclusive services. 
Inactive HA: Inactive HAs will not hold any Mobility 
Bindings and it provides only limited services from Backup 
HA services since any HA in the Home Link can act as 
Inactive HA.  
The VHAHA is configured with static IP address that is 
referred as Global HA Address. The Global HA address is 
defined by the Virtual Identifier and a set of IP addresses. The 
VHAHA may associate an Active HA’s real IP address on an 
interface with the Global HA address. There is no restriction 
against mapping the Global HA address with a different 
Active HA. In case of the failure of an Active HA, the Global 
address can be mapped to some other backup HA that is going 
to act as active HA. If the Active HA becomes unavailable, the 
highest priority Backup HA will become Active HA after a 
short delay, providing a controlled transition of the 
responsibility with minimal service interruption. Besides 
minimizing service interruption by providing rapid transition 
from Active to Backup HA, the VHAHA design incorporates 
optimizations that reduce protocol complexity while 
guaranteeing controlled HA transition for typical operational 
scenarios. The significant feature of this architecture is that, 
the entire process is completely transparent to MN. The MN 
knows only the Global HA address and it is unaware of the 
actual Active HA. It also does not know about the transition 
between backup and active HAs. 
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B. VHAHA Scenario 
Two or more HAs (One active HA and minimum of one 
backup HA) from each Home Link are selected.  Then Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) [20, 21, 22, 23] is constructed among 
the selected HAs through the existing internetworking. This 
VPN is assigned with Global HA address and it will act as 
Global HA. HAs of the VPN will announce their presence by 
periodically multicasting Heart Beat messages inside the 
VPN.  So, each HA will know the status of all other HAs in 
the Private network. 
 
Figure 2. VHAHA Scenario. 
The scenario of VHAHA protocol is given in Fig. 2. The 
protocol works at layer 3. In this approach, the HAs are 
located in different Home Links still sharing the same subnet 
address. The shared subnet address is known as Global HA 
address and the HAs in inter home link are identified by using 
Local HA addresses. The data destined to the MN will be 
addressed to the Global HA address of the MN, which will be 
decapsulated by the Active HA and forwarded to the MN 
appropriately using base Mobile IP. The various steps in 
forwarding the data packets are illustrated in Fig. 2.  
 
Figure 3. Packet Formats 
The packet formats are shown in Fig. 3. As in Mobile IPv6, 
the CNs and MNs only know about the Global HA address. 
The packet (Fig. 3a) addressed to the MN from CN (Fig. 2. 
Step 1) will be directed to the Home Network using the Global 
HA address (Fig. 2. Step 2) of the MN. Here, the Home 
Network refers to the VPN that is constructed by using the 
above procedure. Once the packet reaches the Global HA 
address, all HAs that belong to Global HA address will hear 
the packet and the one which is closer to the MN and has less 
workload will pick up (Fig. 2. Step 3) the packet (Fig. 3b) 
using the internal routing mechanism. Then the packet will be 
routed to the Active HA and this Active HA will do the 
required processing and tunnel the packet (Fig. 3c) to the COA 
of the MN (Fig. 2. Step 4). Finally, the COA decapsulate and 
send the packet (Fig. 3d) to the MN using base Mobile IPv6 
(Fig. 2. Step 5). 
C. Failure detection and Recovery 
In contrast to Mobile IPv6 and other approaches, failure 
detection and tolerance is transparent to the MN. Since the 
MN is unaware of this process, over-the-air (OTA) messages 
are reduced, the complexity of the system is reduced and the 
performance is improved. The failure detection and recovery 
algorithm is illustrated in procedure 1. 
__________________________________________________ 
Begin 
Calculate the priority for HAs that are part of Virtual 
Private Network 
workload(HAi) ? (Current mobility bindings of HAi x 
Current Throughput) / (Maximum no. of mobility 
bindings of HAi x Maximum Throughput) 
Priority(HAi) ? 1/workload(HAi) 
 
If(HAs failed to receive heartbeats from HAx) 
       HAx ? Faulty 
 
If(HAx == Faulty) Then 
Delete entries of HAx from the tables of all HAi, where 
1≤i≤n, i≠x 
      If(HAx == Active HA) Then 
Activate exclusive services of Backup HA 
Active HA ? Backup HA with highest priority 
Backup HA ? Select_Backup_HA (Inactive HA 
with highest priority), 
activate the required services and acquire the binding 
details from primary HA to synchronize with it 
      If(HAx == Backup HA) Then 
Backup HA ? Select_Backup_HA(Inactive HA with 
highest priority),  
activate the required services and acquire the binding 
details from primary HA to synchronize with it. 
      If(HAx == Inactive HA) Then 
Do nothing till it recovers, if it permanently goes off; 
select an Inactive HA from the Home Link of HAx 
End 
__________________________________________________ 
Procedure 1: Failure detection and Recovery 
 
The workload of each HA in the VPN is calculated based 
on the number of mobility bindings associated with each HA. 
This workload is used for setting priority for the HAs. The 
priority is dynamically updated based on the changes in the 
number of mobility bindings. The heartbeat messages are 
exchanged among the HAs at a constant rate. These heartbeat 
messages are used for detecting the failure. When any HA 
fails, it will not broadcast the heartbeat message and all other 
HAs will not receive the heartbeats from the faulty one. 
Hence, the failure of the faulty HA can be detected by all other 
HAs that are part of the VPN.  
Once the failure is detected, entry of that faulty HA will be 
deleted from all other HAs that are part of the Global HA 
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TABLE I.  COMPARISON OF VHAHA WITH OTHER APPROACHES 
Metrics MIPv6 HAHA HARP VHARP TCP VHAHA 
Recovery overhead High No No No No No 
Fault tolerance 
mechanism No MN initiated MN initiated HA initiated HA initiated HA initiated 
Fault tolerant 
Range No 
Covers entire 
range 
Limited to 
Home Link 
Limited to 
Home Link 
Limited to 
Home Link 
Covers entire 
range 
Transparency No No No Yes Yes Yes 
OTA messages 
exchanged for 
recovery 
More More Less  Nil Nil Nil 
 
subnet. Then, if the faulty HA is Active HA, based on the 
priority of backup HAs anyone of the backup HA with the 
highest priority will be mapped to Active HA by activating its 
exclusive services. Now, the new Active HA will be the owner 
of the Global HA address. If the faulty HA is a backup HA 
then anyone of the Inactive HA will be set as the 
corresponding backup HA by activating the required services 
and acquiring binding cache entries from the Primary HA. If 
the Inactive HA is failed then nothing needs to be done. But if 
it permanently goes off, then any other HA from the link will 
be set as Inactive HA. 
The significant feature of this approach is that the Global 
HA address will never change. Based on the availability of the 
Active HA, the Global HA address will be mapped to the 
appropriate backup HA. The CN and the MN would know 
only the Global HA address and do not know any thing about 
this mapping of addresses. All other internal mappings will be 
handled by the VHAHA’s internal routing mechanism.  
D. Performance Evaluations 
The proposed protocol will introduce certain amount of 
overhead in the network to construct the Virtual Network and 
to provide reliability.  Hence, the performance of the proposed 
approach depends on two overheads: (a) Time and (b) Control 
message overhead. In the proposed approach, these two 
overheads depend on the following four factors: (1) VHAHA 
configuration (2) Home Registration (3) failure detection and 
recovery and (4) Over-the-air communication between MNs 
and Mobility Agents. 
1) VHAHA configuration: The VHAHA is configured only 
during the initialization of the network and it will be updated 
only when the inactive HA fails. This happens to be a rare 
case, since most of the implementations will not take any 
action if the Inactive HA fails and let the Inactive HA to heal 
automatically because it will not affect the overall 
performance. Hence, this can be considered as one time cost 
and it is negligible. The Time complexity and message 
complexity introduced to the over all systems are negligible. 
2) Home Registration: This factor depends on the total 
numbers and locations of Active, Backup and Inactive HAs 
that are part of VHAHA network. The registration messages 
include the number of messages required for the MN to get 
registered with the Active HA and the control messages 
required by the Active HA to update this information in all 
other backup and Inactive HAs of the MN. In the proposed 
approach, the Initial registration of the MN should take place 
with the Global HA address instead of with a single HA. 
Hence, this delay will be high when compared to the normal 
Mobile IP registration. The initial registration delay includes 
the time taken by the MN to get registered with the Active HA 
and the time taken by the Active HA to update this 
information in all other backup HAs.  
The Time Complexity is O (D log3k) and Message 
Complexity is O (|1| + klog3k), where ‘D’ is the diameter of 
VHAHA and ‘k’ is number of active, backup and Inactive 
HAs of the MN.  
3) Failure detection and Recovery overhead: The failure is 
detected when heartbeats are not received from a particular 
HA for a particular period of time (T). The heartbeat is 
actually multicasted using the multicast address. The number 
of heartbeats exchanged depends on ‘T’ and the time taken to 
detect the failure depends on the speed of the underlying wired 
network. After the failure is detected, it requires just a single 
message to switch over to the backup HA and the time taken is 
negligible.  
The Time Complexity is O (D log3n) and the Message 
Complexity is O (|L| + nlog3n), where ‘D’ is the diameter of 
VHAHA, ‘n’ is number of HAs that are part of VHAHA and 
‘L’ represents the number of links that constitute VHAHA. 
4) Over-the-air messages: This is very important factor 
because it is dealing with the air interface which is having less 
bandwidth. When OTA messages are increased performance 
of the system will be degraded. But in the proposed approach, 
the MN is not involved in failure detection and recovery 
process, so no OTA messages are exchanged during this 
process. The time and message complexity introduced by this 
factor is Nil. 
From the above description, it is observed that the 
performance of VHAHA is directly proportional to the speed 
of the wired network because the proposal only involves the 
wired backbone operations. Actually, this is not a fair 
constraint because bandwidth of the network is very high 
thanks to the high speed and advanced networks. 
E. Simulation Results and Analysis 
The proposed approach is compared with Simple Mobile 
IPv6, HAHA, HARP, VHARP, and TCP. The comparison 
results are given in Table 1. From the comparisons, it is found 
that VHAHA is persistent and has less overhead when 
compared to other approaches.   
Simulation experiments are performed to verify the 
performance of the proposed protocol. It is done by extending 
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the Mobile IP model given in ns-2 [24]. MIPv6 does not use 
any reliability mechanism; hence the time taken to detect and 
recover from the failure will be high. TCP, VHARP and 
VHAHA take almost same time to recover from the failure. 
This is in the case of the HAs from the same link fail. But, 
when the entire network fails, only the VHAHA survives. All 
other methods will collapse. The following parameters are 
used to evaluate the performance. (i) Failure detection and 
Recovery time when a HA fails in the Home Link (ii) Failure 
detection and Recovery time when entire Home Link fails (iii) 
Home Registration delay (iv) Packet loss (v) Number of 
messages exchanged during registration and (vi) Failure 
detection and Recovery messages. The simulation results are 
shown in Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. The results are also 
compared with Mobile IPv6, TCP and VHARP to analyze the 
performance of the proposed approach.  
1) Failure detection and Recovery time when a HA fails in 
the Home Link: When a particular HA is failed, all other HAs 
will not hear the heartbeat messages. When the heartbeat 
message from a particular HA is missed continuously for three 
times, then it is decided that the particular HA is a faulty HA. 
Once the failure is detected, the corresponding backup HA 
will be activated by the Recovery procedure. The failure 
detection and recovery time (TFD-R) is calculated by using the 
equation (1). 
 
HAdelayOfVHApropTT HRFD .3_ +=  (1) 
 
where TH represents the time required to hear the heartbeat 
messages by HAs. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of Failure detection and recovery time,  
when a HA fails in the Home Link 
 
The Fig. 4 shows the TFD_R of VHAHA and other 
protocols. Base Mobile IPv6 does not take any action for 
failure detection and Recovery of HAs. This needs to be 
handled by MN itself. Because of that, the time taken for 
failure detection and Recovery is very high. This causes 
service interruption to MNs that are affected by the faulty HA. 
Other schemes like TCP, VHARP and VHAHA handle the 
problem and almost take same amount of time for failure 
detection and Recovery.    
2) Failure detection and Recovery time when entire Home 
Link fails: The proposed protocol constructs VPN by 
considering HAs from different Home links. Hence, when one 
Home Link fails completely also, the proposed approach 
handles the problem in normal manner as described in 
previous section. But TCP and VHARP will collapse and 
Failure detection and Recovery will be left to MNs.  
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Figure 5.  Comparison of Failure detection and recovery time,  
when the entire Home Link fails 
 
This situation is represented in Fig. 5, where VHAHA’s 
Recovery time is almost equal to the previous scenario. But, 
TCP and VHARP approaches fail to handle the situation and 
Recovery time is very high which is equal to that of base 
MIPv6. 
3) Registration delay: The registration delay is calculated 
by using the equation (2). The Active HA Registration delay is 
equal to that of base MIPv6. Nowadays, the bandwidth of the 
core network is very high and hence the propagation delay of 
the VHAHA is very less. The values are given in Fig. 6 and it 
is compared with other protocols. 
 
HAdelayOfVHApropdelayregdelayreg HAActive ... += − (2) 
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Figure 6.  Comparison of Home Registration delay  
 
4) Packet loss: The packet losses of the compared 
protocols are represented in Fig. 7. From the Figure, it is 
inferred that packet loss in the proposed approach is very less 
when compared with MIPv6, TCP and VHARP, because it is 
able to handle both intra link and interlink failures.  
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Figure 7. Comparison of Packet Loss 
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5) Number of messages exchanged during registration: 
This includes number of messages required to register with the 
Active HA and Binding Update messages to the backup HA 
during the Initial Registration, FA Registration and 
deregistration. Again, the bandwidth of the core network is 
very high and hence delay experienced by the MN will be 
negligible. This is illustrated in the Fig. 8. From the Figure, it 
is found that the number of messages exchanged in VHAHA is 
somewhat high when compared to base protocol but it is 
comparable with the VHARP protocol. 
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Figure 8.  Comparison of no. of  msgs exchanged 
 during Home Registration 
 
6) Failure detection and Recovery messages: This is 
represented in Fig 9. Here, also the complexity of the VHAHA 
is approximately equal to that of VHARP while TCP based 
mechanism is having less complexity and the base protocol is 
having the maximum complexity. 
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Figure 9. Comparison of no. of failure detection  
and Recovery messages  
F. Observation 
From the results and analysis, it is observed that the 
proposed approach outperforms all other reliability 
mechanisms because it survives even when the entire Home 
link fails. The overhead and complexity introduced by the 
proposed approach is almost negligible when compared to 
other existing recovery mechanisms. The failure detection and 
recovery overhead imposed by the proposed approach is 
increased by 2% when compared to VHARP. The home 
registration delay is also increased by 2% when compared to 
VHARP. The packet loss in the proposed approach is reduced 
by 25% when compared to all other approaches.  
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V. VHAHA SECURE REGISTRATION 
The VHAHA secure registration protocol is based on self 
certified keys. Self-certified public keys were introduced by 
Girault. In contrast to the traditional public key infrastructure 
(PKI), self-certified public keys do not require the use of 
certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys. The 
authenticity of self-certified public key is verified implicitly 
by the proper use of the private key in any cryptographic 
applications in a logically single step. Thus, there is no chain 
of certificate authorities in self-certified public keys. This 
property of the self certified keys optimizes the registration 
delay of the proposed protocol at the same time ensuring 
registration security.  
A. VHAHA Secure Registration 
Protocol 
The proposed protocol is divided into three different parts: 
(i) Mobile node’s initial registration with home network (ii) 
Registration protocol of MN (from Foreign Network) with 
authentication and (iii) Authentication between MN and CN. 
The MN’s initial registration part deals with how the MN is 
initially registered with its Home Network. First, the identity 
of the MN is verified and other details like nonce, Temporary 
Identity and secret key between MN and HA will be assigned 
to the MN. 
__________________________________________________ 
a. Mobile node initial registration with home 
network(VHAHA) 
(IR1) Verify the Identity of the MN 
(IR2) Allocate nonce, Temporary ID(H(IDMN//NHA) and 
shared secret KMN-HA 
(IR3) Transfer these details to the MN through secret 
channel and also store in the HA’s database. 
 
b. Registration protocol of MN (from Foreign Network) with 
authentication 
Agent Advertisement: 
(AA1) FA ? MN: M, where M1 = Advertisement, FAid, 
MNCoA, NFA,wF 
Registration: 
(R1) MN ? FA: M2, <M2>KMN-HA 
 where M2 = Request, Key-Request, FAid, HAid, 
MNCoA, NHA, NMN, NFA, H(IDMN || NHA), wH 
(R2) FA: (upon receipt of R1) 
• Validate NFA and Compute the key KFA-HA   
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•     Compute MAC 
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(R3)   FA ? HA:  M3 , <M3>KFA-HA,  where M3 = M2, 
<M2>KMN-HA , FAid, wF  
(R4) HA: (upon receipt of R3) 
• Check whether FAid in M3  equals FAid in R1. 
• Compute the key, 
 
]mod.)[(]mod)([ )(1
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1 nFAwHnIwHK HidHH
x
id
FAh
F
x
F
Ih
FHAFA +=+=−  
 
• Compute MAC* and compare it with MAC value 
received. This is the authentication of FA by HA 
• Check the identity of the MN in HA’s database. 
• Produce new nonce NHA’, new Temporary 
ID(H(IDMN|| NHA’)) and new session key K’MN-FA 
and overlay the details in database. 
(R5) HA ? FA:  M4, <M4>KFA-HA 
If IDMN is found out in HA’s dynamic parameter database,  
 M4=M5, <M5>KMN-HA, NFA, {KMN-FA}KFA-HA              
 Else, 
 M4 = M5, <M5>K0MN-HA, NFA, {KMN-FA}, KFA-HA 
  M5 = Reply, Result, Key-Reply, MNHM, HAid, 
N’HA,NMN 
(R6) FA: (upon receipt of R5) 
• Validate NFA 
• Validate <M4>KFA-HA with KFA-HA. This is the 
authentication of FA to HA.  
• Decrypt {KMN-FA}KFA-HA with KFA-HA and get the 
session key KMN-FA 
(R7) FA ? MN: M5, <M5>KMN-HA 
(R8) MN: (upon receipt of R7) 
• Validate NMN 
• Validate <M5>KMN-HA with the secret key, KMN-
HA used in R1. This is the authentication of MN 
to HA. 
 
c. Authentication between MN and CN 
(A1) MN ? HA2: M1 <M1>KMN-HA2, where 
M1=Auth-Request, MNCOA, CNCOA, NMN, wMN 
(A2) HA2: (Upon receipt of A1) 
• Validate NMN, and compute MAC 
• HA2 ? CN: M2 <M2>KHA2-CN , where M2= 
M1 <M1>KMN-HA2 
(A3) CN ? MN: M3 <M3>KCN-MN, wCN,  where M3 
=Auth-Response, MNCOA, CNCOA, h(NMN) 
• Validate MAC and nonce. This is the 
authentication of HA2 and MN by CN. 
• Compute KCN-MN 
(A4) MN: (Upon receipt of A3) 
• Validate MAC and nonce. This is the 
authentication of HA2 and CN by MN. 
• Compute KCN-MN 
__________________________________________________ 
Procedure 2: VHAHA Secure Registration Protocol 
 
The second part deals with how the MN is registered with 
the Foreign Network when it roams away from the Home 
Network. There is no change in Agent advertisement part 
except that the MN authenticates the FA using its witness 
value. And, in Registration part, instead of passing the MN’s 
actual identity, it is combined with nonce and then hashed. 
This provides the location anonymity. Also, the witness value 
is passed which enables the calculation of shared secrets.  
The third part deals with the authentication between MN 
and CN. This authentication enables the MN to communicate 
with the CN directly which resolves the triangle routing 
problem. First MN sends the authentication request to the 
Home Agent (HA2) of the MN. There the HA2 verifies and 
authenticates the MN and forward the message to CN. The CN 
validates the MN, calculates the shared secret and sends 
response to MN. Finally, the MN calculates the shared secret 
and validates the CN. Then, the MN and CN can directly 
communicate each other. The details of the proposed protocol 
are summarized in procedure 2. 
B. Performance Evaluations 
In this section, the security aspects of the proposed 
protocol are analyzed. The following attributes have been 
considered for the analyses are: (i) Data confidentiality, (ii) 
Authentication, (iii) Location anonymity and synchronization 
and (iv) Attack prevention.  
1) Confidentiality: Data delivered through the Internet can 
be easily intercepted and falsified. Therefore, ensuring 
confidentiality of communication data is very important in 
Mobile IP environment. The data confidentiality of the various 
protocols and the proposed one is listed in the Table 2.  
TABLE II.  DATA CONFIDENTILAITY ANALYSIS 
Methods MN-FA 
FA-
HA 
MN-
HA 
CN-
MN 
Secret key No No Yes Yes 
CA-PKI No No Yes Yes 
Minimal Public 
key Yes No Yes Yes 
Hybrid Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self certified Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VHAHA secure 
Registration Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The proposed approach achieves data confidentiality 
between all pairs of network components. From the table, it is 
found that Hybrid and Self certified approaches also provide 
the same result. But the computational complexities of these 
protocols are high when compared to the proposed one, due to 
the usage public keys and dynamically changing secret keys.  
2) Authentication: Prior to data delivery, both parties must 
be able to authenticate one another’s identity.  It is necessary 
to avoid any bogus parties from sending unwanted messages 
to the entities. The Mobile IP user authentication protocol is 
different from the general user service authentication protocol. 
Table 3 shows the authentication analysis of various protocols 
with the proposed one. From the analysis, it is found that the 
VHAHA secure registration excels all approaches because it 
provides authentication between all pairs of the networking 
nodes.  
53 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009 
TABLE III.  AUTHENTICATION  ANALYSIS 
Methods MN-FA FA-HA MN-HA MN-CN 
Secret key None None MAC None 
CA-PKI Digital Signature 
Digital 
Signature 
Digital 
Signature None 
Minimal 
Public key None None 
Digital 
Signature None 
Hybrid None Digital Signature 
Symmetric 
Encryption None 
Self certified None 
MAC 
(Static/ 
dynamic 
key) 
MAC 
(dynamic 
key) 
None 
VHAHA 
secure 
Registration 
TTP 
 
MAC 
(Static/ 
dynamic) 
MAC 
(dynamic 
key) 
MAC 
(dynamic 
key) 
 
3)  Location Anonymous and Synchronization: The 
proposed approach uses temporary identity instead of the 
actual identity of the MNs. Since, the actual location of the 
MN is not revealed to the outsides environment (i.e. CNs and 
Foreign links). Similarly, the proposed approach maintains 
two databases: (i) Initial parameter base and (ii) Dynamic 
parameter base. These are used for maintaining 
synchronization between MNs and HAs. The results are given 
in table 4. 
TABLE IV.  LOCATION ANONYMITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION 
Methods Location anonymity Synchronization 
Secret key No No 
CA-PKI No No 
Minimal Public key No No 
Hybrid No No 
Self certified No No 
VHAHA secure 
Registration Yes Yes 
 
4) Attack Prevention: The following attacks are 
considered for the analysis: (i) Replay attack (ii) TCP Splicing 
attack (iii) Guess attack (iv) Denial-of-Service attack (v) Man-
in-the-middle attack and (vi) Active attacks. Table 5 shows the 
attack prevention analyses of the various approaches.  
TABLE V.  ATTACK PREVENTION ANALYSIS 
Methods Re-play 
Splic
-ing  Guess  DOS  
Man in  
middle 
Acti-
ve  
Secret 
key No No No No Yes Yes 
CA-PKI No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Minimal 
Public 
key 
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Hybrid Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
certified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VHAHA 
secure 
Registrat
-ion 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
C. Simulation Results and Analysis 
The system parameters are shown in Table 6. The 
cryptography operation time on the FA, HA and MN is 
obtained from [25]. The following parameters are used for the 
evaluation: (i) Registration delay and (ii) Registration 
Signaling traffic. 
1) Registration delay: The registration delay plays an 
important role in deciding the performance of the Mobile IP 
protocol. To strengthen the security of the Mobile IP 
registration part, the data transmission speed can not be 
compromised because it will cause the direct impact on the 
end user. If the delay is high, then the interruption and packet 
loss will be more. Due to the properties of public keys, 
naturally the registration delay of these protocols is very high 
and the packet loss is also high. But certificate based protocols 
are not based on public keys and thanks to the properties of the 
certificates, the delay is less. The registration time is 
calculated by using the equation (3) and the results are given 
in table 7.  
 
MNFAFAHAHAFAFAMN RREPRREPRREQRREQTimeg −−−− +++=.Re  (3) 
 
where, RREQMN-FA is the time taken to send the registration 
request from MN to FA, RREQFA-HA is the time taken to 
forward the registration request from FA to HA, RREPHA-FA is 
the time taken to send the registration reply from HA to FA 
and RREPFA-MN   is the time taken to forward the registration 
reply from FA to MN. 
TABLE VI.  COMPARISON OF REGISTRATION DELAY 
Methods 
RREQ 
MN-FA 
(1)  
RREQ 
FA-HA 
(2)  
RREP 
HA-FA 
(3) 
RREP 
FA-MN 
(4)  
Delay 
(ms) 
(1)+(2)+ 
(3)+(4)  
Secret 
key 2.7191 1.004 1.0144 2.7031 7.4406 
CA-PKI 7.6417 5.9266 6.3170 7.6457 27.5312 
Minimal 
Public 
key 
2.8119 0.9966 10.8770 7.7466 22.4322 
Hybrid 2.7934 16.0565 15.011 2.8007 36.6625 
Self 
certified 3.4804 14.2649 1.0176 2.8402 21.6023 
VHAHA 
Registrat
-ion 
3.3813 7.64708 1.0156 2.7615 14.8056 
 
2) Registration Signaling Traffic: The computation 
overhead depends on the amount of traffic (i.e. the packet size) 
that is to be transmitted to successfully complete the 
registration. If the amount of signaling traffic is high means, 
computational complexity at the MN and the mobility agents 
will be high. The signaling traffic of the various protocols 
considered for comparison are computed and given in Table 8. 
From the table, it is observed that VHAHA secure registration 
is having the lowest traffic. Hence complexity is less both at 
MNs and Mobility Agents. Because of the lowest traffic, the 
bandwidth consumption is comparatively less. 
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TABLE VII.  COMPARISON OF REGISTRATION TRAFFIC 
Methods MN-FA 
FA-
HA 
HA-
FA  
FA-
MN 
Size  
(bytes) 
Secret key 50 50 46 46 192 
CA-PKI 224  288  64  128  704 
Minimal 
Public key 178  178  174  174  704 
Hybrid 66  578  582  66  1292 
Self certified 226  404  124  70  824 
VHAHA 
Registration 206  364  108  54  732 
 
D. Observation 
The proposed approach does not affect the complexity of 
the initial registration. But, foreign network registration delay 
is significantly increased due to the application of security 
algorithms. From the procedure 2, it is understood that the 
proposed scheme does not change the number of messages 
exchanged for the registration process. But, the size of the 
message will be increased due to the security attributes that are 
passed along with the registration messages.  
From the results and analysis, it is observed that the 
VHAHA secure registration reduces the registration delay 
overhead by 40% and signaling traffic overhead by 20% when 
compared to other approaches. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes a fault-tolerant and secure framework 
for mobile IPv6 based networks that is based on inter home 
link HA redundancy scheme and self-certified keys. The 
performance analysis and the comparison results show that the 
proposed approach has less overhead and the advantages like, 
better survivability, transparent failure detection and recovery, 
reduced complexity of the system and workload, secure data 
transfer and improved overall performance. Moreover, the 
proposed approach is compatible with the existing Mobile IP 
standard and does not require any architectural changes. This 
is also useful in future applications like VoIP and 4G. The 
formal load balancing of workload among the HAs of the VPN 
is left as future work. 
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